




Owing to the continued and augmenting pressure of the financial
revulsion which commenced in the year 1857, questions relating to
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS are constantly arising in the courts of
those states where laws of this character exist. Many of these
questions are equally novel, important and difficult. Statutes
exempting Homesteads from judicial sale now exist in perhaps a
majority of the states.' In a number of the states such exemption
has been made the subject of express Constitutional provision. 2
The main object of the laws, whether statutory or constitutional, is
in all cases the same. The leading ideas and general features of
various statutes are not substantially dissimilar. But the amount
exempted, both as to value and quantity, the manner of arriving
at and subjecting to sale the excess, with many other minor and
subordinate details are not precisely alike in scarcely any two of
the states. Many of the statutes are crude, defective and imper-
I Among others in Ohio, Illinois, New York, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, Texas,
Maine, California, A.chigan, New Hampshire, Iowa, Vermont, and, in a qualified
manner, in Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Indiana and Louisiana.
2 Texas, Wisconsin, Indiana and California.
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fet,-a fact always noticed and fiequently deprecated by judges
whose perplexing duty it has been to construe and apply them.
Rolden vs. Pinney, 6 Cal. 285; fe fenstein vs. Gore, 8 Iowa 287;
Keyes vs. Hill, 80 Verm. 767.
The decisions, as will presently be seen, even when made under
statutes whose provisions were substantially the same, are more
than usually inharmonious. This is attributable in part, doubtless,
to the novelty of the questions presented, for in most of the states
where such statutes now exist, the policy of exempting homesteads
was not adopted until comparatively a recent date: It is also to
be ascribed in part, no doubt, to the intricate characte of many
of the questions presented for adjudication; for in every depart-
ment of the law there are and will ever continue to be questions so
nearly poised that it is vain to'expect an eitire concurrence of pro-
fessional or judicial opinion. While this is so, I am, after a pretty
thorough examination of the various statutes and decisions, fully
convinced that much of the conflict would have been avoided, if the
courts had been-more fully aware of the decisions of sister courts
in other states.
Although the title-HOMEPTEAD-hadAo place in the Reports
until about ten years since, and none in the Digests until about
six ye4rs ago, so many decisions have since been mad6, that I
believe it to be practicable to classify theth, and to deduce fiin
them (in some instances not without "ncerta'intyian d"oubt." §te
sure,) many general principles. I am not,aw~re that such gi -task
has before, at least to any considerable extent, been attempted,; I
have aimed constantly to keep in -view the influence and &perati~n
of special statutes and particular phraseology, and when the deci-
sions have turned upon these, the circumstance has'been careNiuiy
noted.
In all the statutes which have come under my observation, the
extent of the ground of the homestead or the value is lmmixted;
sometimes there is a limitation in both 6f these resects. iietre is
usually a restriction-as to -alienation ;, the husband, if married,
being prohibited from selling or-couveying'the 16i-estead, unless
the wife concurs in and signs the onvq.titice.- 'The substoe'in
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these and other particulars of the Acts of some of the States is
briefly given in the note.' With this before us we shall the better
I OHI.-Act passed Mqrch 23, 1850. Exempts "from sale on any execution on
any judgment or decree the family homestead of each head of a family to the extent
of $500 in value." ( 1.) Provides for homestead rights in leased estates. ( 5.)
M Iortgage executed by husband alone does not affect right of wife o family. (Q 9.)
Swan's St. pp. 711, 712.
I.LIVoIs.-Act passed February 11, 1851. R, St. p. 650. Exempts "from levy
and forced sale under execution, the lot of ground and buildings thereon, occupied
as a residence and owned by the debtor, being a householder and having a family,
to the extent in value of $1000." -* "No release or waiver of such exemption
shall be valid, unless in writing, subscribed by the householder and acknowledged
like deeds," &c. (Q 1.)
NEw Yonx.-Act passed April 10, 1850. R. St. 615. Substantially and almost
literally like the Illinois statute above. The act requires the deed to the party, or
the "Homestead Exemption Book," to show that the property is a homestead, to
entitle it to exemption. The Illinois statute does not so require.
Wisco-s.-The constitution requires the legislature to provide "wholesome
laws, exempting a reasonable amount of property from seizure or sale" for future
debts. "A homestead" not exceeding forty acres in the country, used for agricul-
tural purposes, or not exceeding one-quarter of an acre in a town or city, "and the
dwelling-house owned and occupied by any resident of the state, shall not be sub-
ject to forced sale on execution." 23, R. St. pp. 785, 798. A deed or mortgage
of the homestead "shall not be valid without the signature of the wife," &c. After-
wards the Act of Mday 17, 1858, provided that the owner might remove from, or
sell or convey, the homestead, without making it liable. And that no judgment,
in either Federal or state courts,'shall be a lien on the homestead. No limit as to
value of homestead.
'AfSSACHUSTTS.-Exempts "from attachment, levy on execution and sale for
debts" the homestead, whether possessed by lease or otherwise, to the extent of
$800. Wife mtst join in any conveyance or release in the same manner as she
joins in releasing dower. If the parties are interested partition may be had. (13
Gray 21; 2 Id. 383.)
INDIANA.-Similar constitutional provision to Wisconsin. The legislature under
this have exempted (Act of February 17, 1852, R. St., vol. ii., p. 337) property to
the amount of $300. It may be real or personal or both, at debtor's election. If
real property, no "mortgage or sale, is valid, unless acknowledged by the wife
in due fbrm of law." (9 Ind. 109.) Property to exempt from execution only in
actions upon contracts. 9 Ind. 19.6.
Pr NssYLvAA.-Quasi homestead act. (Act of April 9, 1849, Dunlop's Laws,
p. 1M8.) While the act does not mention homestead, it exempts "from levy and
sale property owned by or in possession of the debtor, to the extent of $300 ;" and
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appreciate the exact force and "value of the decisions to be cited
from those states.
the defendant may elect to retain the amount in real estate. [WheIn he may elect,
&c., 4 Harris 300; 6 Id. 307; 11 Id. 310. How waived. '12 Id. 426.]
TEXAS.-COnstitution provides "that the homestead" (defining extent and value)
"shall not be subject to forced sale for debts hereafter contracted." "Nor shall
the owner, if a married man, alien the same, unless by the consent of his wife, in
such manner as the legislature shall point out."
NEw HAmPsmREs.-Act of July 4, 1851, exempts "lthe family ,homestead of the
head of each family to the value of $500 ;" declares it 41 not to be assts while
occupied by widow or any of the minor children," and that.no release or waiver
shall be valid,unless executed by husband and wife; if the wife be dead and there
are minor children, the consent of the judge of probate must be had, &c.
Mississppi.-Act of 22d January, 1841, exempts to every white citizen, being
the head of a family one hundred and sixty aces of land. Law , 1841,' q1187 or
is such land assets for the payment of debts. Aforrison vs.' HcDak ell, 30 Miss. 218.
M Ncak.-Law provides "that a homestead not to exceed fbrty acres,, or one
lot in town not to exceed in value $1500, and the dwelling-house thereon, &c:,
owned and occupied, shall not be subject to forced sale on execution." Act of 25
March, 1848, and New Const. art. XVI. 1.
No mortgage or alienation. is valid withouit the signature of the wife.
AnxiE.-Exempts (Act 1850) lands and buildings niot exceeding $500 in value.
Must file certificate with register of deeds in order to elaim the exemption.,
IowA.-Code of 1851 exempts "from judicial sale the homeltead of everyhead
of a family. Widow or widowef, though without children, deemed head of family,
while continuing to occupy. A conveyance by owner, af rmefidmle 8 ono vafl0lt
unless the husbanid and wife concur in arid sign stioh co~ie e:- -... . : '
It is made liable for taxes, mechanics' liens, and prior debts, anid delits created
prior to the acquisition of the homestead. "The homestead must embrace the
house used as a home by the owner thereof." If he has two or more, he may
select which he will retain as a hdmestead. Tracts of land "must be contiguous,
unless they are habitually and in good faith used as par of the same homestead."
No limit as to value, but only to extent. Failure to record in "Homestead Book,"
does not make it liable.
CAyoR =A.-By section 15 of the constitution it is provided, that "the legis-
lature shall protect by law from forced sale a certain portion of the homestead and
other property of all heads of families."
The act of the legislature requires the homestead to consist of a certain quantity
of land with the dwelling-house, &c., not exceeding in value $5000.
Lou~sIA .- Act of March 17, 1852, entitled "An act to provide a homestead
for the widow and children of deceased persons." The act gives to necessitOus
widows and children the preferred right to $1000 out of the estate of the deceased.
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The subject will be treated under the following arrangement:-
I.-OBJECT OF THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION, AND RULES OF
CONSTRUCTION.
II.-LEGAL ATTRIBUTES OF A HOMESTEAD-NATURE AND Ex-
TENT OF RIGHT.
III.-THE HOMESTEAD RIGHT-HOW PARTED WITH OR LOST:-
1. By Voluntary Sale and Conveyance:
2. By Judicial Sale under Mortgage:
8. By total and absolute Abandonment.
IV.-WHETHER A JUDGMENT IS A LjIEN UPON THE HOMESTEAD.
V.-HOMESTEAD RIGHT SUBORDINATI TO VENDOR'S CLAIM FOR
PURCHASE-MONEY, &C.
'I.-OBJECT OF THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION AND RULES OF CON-
STRUCTION.-The object of all rules or maxims of interpretation
.is to discover the true intent and meaning of a law or constitution.
When the words are explicit and unambiguous they, of course,
are to govern. If doubt exists recourse must be had to the occa-
sion and necessity of the provision, the mischief felt, and the
remedy had in view by the law-making power. When the inten-
tion thus collected is clearly ascertained it will be followed, though
contrary to the letter of the statute. This principle finds an ap-
propriate illustration in a case decided under a statute similar in
character to those we are now discussing. Thus, where the act
exempted " all sheep to the number of ten with their fleeces," &c.,
VEnmoNT.-Act declares that "if any head of a family shall decease, leaving a
widow, his homestead, to the value of $500, shall wholly pass to his widow and
children without being subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased, unless
specialty chargeable thereon," &c. (Q 4.)
Exempts homestead and yearly products in favor of the housekeeper or head of
a family.
Shall not be alienated or encumbered, except by the joint deed of the husband
and wife, executed and acknowledged by her, the same as if it was real estate to
which. she holds the title.
GEoRGIA.-Acts of 1841 and 1843, exempt fifty acres of land to each -white
citizen of the State, and five dditional acres for each child under the age of
fifteen. Both husband and wife must join in conveying. Act does not protect
property from judgments founded on torts. Datis is. Hensen, 29 Geo. 345.
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it was held that the intent was to secure to the family wool equal
in amount to that grown on a given nunmber of sheep, though tho
debtor should not be the owner of the sheep. Hall vs. Penney, 11
Wend. 44. So where the statute exempted -one cow and one
swine," the question was made that after the *animal was slaugh-
tered and packed away for use it was no longer a swine, and,
therefore, not exempt. But the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
very properly held otherwise, observing that " the statute intended
the sustenance of a poor family," and is to be sensibly construed
in view of the objects aimed at. Gibson vs. Jenney, 15 Mass. 205;
Simonds vs. Powers, 28 Verm. 355; Johnson vs. Richdrdson, 33
Miss. 465.
The statement of this elementary principle of construction, and
these illustrations of its application, sufficiently show the import-
ance, in the construction and application of homestead laws, of
keeping in constant view the object and design of the legislature-
in their enactment.
The homestead policy has been characterized by the courts as
"beneficent," (4 Cal. 23, 26,) "liberal, wise, and benevolent," (1
Iowa 441, 512,) "humane in its character," &a. (28 Verm. 674.)
The leading object of the homestead exemption is, of course, to
protect and preserve the home,-a home not for the husband. alone,
but for him and his wife and children. Floyd vs. -Hosier, I Iowa
512; 6 Id. 30. "A A place where they may live in society beyond
the reach of financial misfortune and the demands of creditors."
Per BALDWIN, J., in -Parsons vs. Livingston et al., 11 Iowa 106.
Beecher vs. Baldy, 7 Mich. 506; Robinson vs. Wiley, 15 N. Y.
492. The beneficent provisions of the law are especially designed
to guard the wife and children against the neglect, the misfortunes,
and improvidence of the father and husband. Cook vs. M hrigtian,
4 Cal. 23, 26; North vs. Shearn, 15 Texas 176; Wood vs. Wheeler, 7.
Id. 13, 20; Keyes vs. Hill, 30 Verm. 759. And the children, equally
with the wife, are within the benefits designed to be conferred by
the statute. Lies vs. De -iablar, 12 Cal. 327; -Dickson vs. Chorn,
6 Iowa 30; Norris vs. Moulton, 34 N. H. 392; Johnson vs. Bich-
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ardson, 83 Mliss. 464; Walters vs. The People, 21 Ill. 178; Tran-
zant vs. J'anzant, 23 Ill. 536.
The homestead policy has also a political bearing; and in this
view it has a broader range and other objects than the mere
security of the husband and children against want. " The design,"
says the Supreme Court of Texas, "is to protect citizens and
families not simply from destitution, but to cherish those feelings
of independence so essential to the maintenance of free institu-
tions." Franklin vs. Cfoffee, 18 Texas 413. The same idea was
years before expressed and enforced by one of the most sagacious
and able of American statesman. Advocating, in 1829, in the
United States Senate, the adoption of a general homestead policy,
Colonel Benton said:-" Tenantry is unfavorable to freedom. It
lays the foundation for separate orders in society, annihilates the
love of country, and weakens the spirit of independence. The
tenant has, in fact, no country, no hearth, no domestic altar, no
household god. The freeholder, on the contrary, is the natural
supporter of a free government; and it should be the policy of
republics to multiply their freeholders, as it is the policy of
monarchies to multiply tenants." (1 Thirty Years' View, pp. 103,
104.)
It is not to be doubted that a large proportion of our wonderful
national growth and prosperity is directly attributable to the fact
that so much of the land is owned in fee simple, and that the gieat
mass of farmers cultivate it as owners and not as tenants. They
have therefore happily been spared from knowing and feeling the
deep and exhaustive meaning, the o'erfraught and painful signi-
ficance of the words DISTRESS and RENT.
There is some want of agreement among the authorities as to
whether statutes of exemption should be strictly or liberally con-
strued. By some courts it is considered that statutes of this cha-
racter are not remedial in their nature, and being in derogation
of the common law, are not entitled to a liberal construction. Bue
vs. Alter, 5 Denio 119; Allen vs. Cook, 26 Barb. 374. But the
prevailing opinion is thaf, in view of their benevolent and humane
character, they are entitled to be liberally viewed by the courts.
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Hoitt vs. Webb, 36 N. IH. 166; True'vs. Morrill, 28 Verm. 674;
Charless vs. Lamberson, 1 Iowa 441. And are rimedial in their
nature: Deere vs. Chapman, 25 fI. 610; Richardson vs. Bui'fbell,
10 Met. 507; 22 Conn. 38; 21 Ill. 44; Hill vs. Johnson; 29
Penn. St. R. 368. "
The question, however, whether they shall be liberally or rigidly
interpreted is not of much practical importance. They should 'be
sensibly construed, with a view to secure the object aimed at their
enactment. Gibson vs. Jenney, 15 Mass. 205.
Indeed, "cthe current of- authority at the present day," says
Mr. Justice BRoNsoN, " is in favor of reading statutes according to
the most natural and obvious import of the language, without resort-
big to subtle or forced constructiops for the purpose either of
limiting or extending their operation. Courts cannot correct what
they may deem excesses or omissions in legislation." Waller'v-s.
Harris, 20 Wend. 562. See, also, observations of RED F ELD, C.
J., in Rowe vs. Adams, 28 Verm. 543.
In connection with the foregoing, the furrther thought must be
borne in mind, that the homestead exemption is created by, arid
is based wholly upon statute law, or constitutional provision. ' 'It
hence results that the party claiming the right or privilege muA
accept of it, if at all, under just the qualifications' ind coyditibns,
neither fewer or different, under which the ld* 'girei it." -Abia
whether he asserts this right as a plaintiff, o Inairtaini it a a
defendant, he must, by his pleadings and pr6bf, Jbirhg hii ~lks
within the provisions of the law.' .effentein vb. doie,'16*d
287; 1 Id. 441; Beecher vs. Baldy 7' Mich. 5OT; Wdlt er vs.
The People, 18 fI. 194; Kitchell vs. Burgwin,'21 Ill. '44. Oe' A
least ,within the spirit and equity of the act." Per BEx'=.1,
in Tme vs. Morrill, 28 Verm. 674. '.. I
1 Thus, where the statute gives a homestead, provided it does not exceed a specie.
fied value, if the property when reduced to the smallest quantity, such as the
dwelling-house and appurtenances exceeds such value, it is not exempt. Relfen-
stdn vs. Gore, suprd. Cited and approved: Beecher vs. Baldy, 7 Mich. 500. And
while it is competent for the legislature, in such case, to exempt something out dft
it, or in lieu of it, as an equivalent in value, it is 'a matter of legislation; and 'nOt
of judicial discretion, to say what the equivalent shall be. Id.
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Some of the statutes require the defendant to take certain steps
to obtain the benefit of the exemption. When this is the case, the
requirements of the statute must be pursued before levy, or at
least before sale, or conveyance by the husband. Manning vs.
Dove, 10 Rich. S. C. (Law) 395; Frierson vs. Wesbery, 11 Id. 353 ;
Slanker vs. Beardsly, 9 Ohio St. 589; Helfenstein vs. Gore, 3
Iowa 292; People vs. Plumsted, 2 Mich. (Gibbs) 469; Frost vs.
Shaw, 3 Ohio St. 270; Clark vs. Potter, 15 Gray 21; Lawton vs.
Bruce, 39 Maine 484; Pinkerton vs. q'umlin, 22 Geo. 165;
.Herschfeldat vs. George, 6 Mich. 456; 7 Id. 510; Line's Appeal,
2 Grant's Cases 197. And the wife and children are, in such case,
affected by the failure or default of the head of the family to do
what the statute requires. Davenport vs. Alston, 14 Georgia 271;
Crow vs. Whitworth, 20 Id. 38; Tadlock vs. Ecles, 20 Texas
782; Brewer vs. Wall, 23 Id. 589; Getzler vs. Saroni, 18 Ill.
518; Simpson vs. Simpson, 30 Ala. 225. When such is the re-
quirement of the statute, there must be not only ownership and
occupation, but a selection of the premises as a homestead. People
vs. Plum ted, supra. See, also, Beecher vs. Baldy, 7 Mich. 503,
505. But such selection, unless the statute so requires, need not
be in writing. Id. Nor need it be recorded if the law does not
so provide. Cook vs. MeChristian, 4 Cal. 23, 26; Reynolds vs.
Pixley, 6 Cal. 165.
IL-LEG AL ATTRIBUTES OF A HOMESTEAD -N ATURE AND
EXTENT OF RIGHT.-A homestead is a house used as a home,
together with the prescribed quantity of land on which the house
is situated. The word home is to have its ordinary and usual
signification. "Stethe or sted betokeneth," says Lord Coke,
"c properly the bank of a river, and in many places a place." Co.
Litt. 4, 6. Homestead therefore means the home-place.1  RICHIARD-
SON, C. J., 7 N. H. 245; 39 Id. 483.
I The term "homestead" does not necessarily imply all those parcels of land
which may adjoin. 7 N. H. 245. Nor does it apply to leased property, though it
adjoins premises used as a homestead, when such leased property is occupied by
tenants and was never occupied as a horne'by the owner. And property thus
leased constitutes no part of the homestead even though the homestead proper
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"c The homestead is the dwelling-place of the family wherp they
permanently reside." Cook vs. Me Christian, 4 CaL 26. In general
it may be said that to constitute a homestead there must be actua
occupation and use of the premises as a home by the family. 'fhe
premises must be appropriated, dedicated, or used for the purpose
designated by the law, to wit: as a ,,home"-a place to abide and
reside in-a place for the family. This use must be actual and
not constructive. It may be laid down as a general rule that the
premises do not become impressed with the legal character of a
homestead until actual residence and occupation by the family as a
home.' H7olden vs. Pinney, 6 Cal. 235, 625; Aorris vs. I3oulton,
34 N. H. 392 ; Benedict vs. Bunnell, 7 Cal. 245; Meyer vs. Claus,
15 Texas 516; Wisner vs. -Farnham, 2 Mich. 472; Rix vs.
MAcHenry, 7 Cal. 89; Charless vs. Lamberson, 1 Iowa 435; Rhodes
vs. McCormick, 4 Iowa 373; Williams vs. Swetland, 10 Iowa 51;
Pilleo vs. Smalley, 23 Texas 498; Hoirn vs. Tufts, 89 N. H. 478,
does not equal the value allowed by statute. Hoitt vs. Webb, 39 N. H. 168; .Davi8
vs. Andrews, 80 Verm. 678; Walters vs. The People, 18 Ini. 194; S. C. 21 InI. 178,
where it is held that the "occupancy" required by the statute may be by tenants.
So held, also, in 23 Ill. 536.
I It seems to be the opinion of the Supreme'Court of Texas (but the point -4.1s
3lot necessarily involved in the case) that a homestead exemption will attach by
gpreparation= to improve of such a character and to such an extent as to manifes
beyond doubt the intention to complete the improvements, and reside upon the
place as a home." Franklin vs. Coffee, 18 Texas 413; 20 Id. 11; 15 Id. 176.
But in Iowa the contrary has been expressly ruled. It is held that premites Ao
not become a homestead until actually occupied by thd o'wner as a hlowe, End' there-
fore if they should be levied on prior to such occupancy, and pending the making
of improvements with a view to reside thereon, they would be liable. Constru..-
tire occupation by fencing and cultivating -will not do. Charless vs. Lamberson,
1 Iowa 435. See, also, Wisner vs. Farnham, 2 Mich. 472. It is believed that the
latter view is not only more correct as a question of construction, but sounder &s
a matter of policy.
Actual occupation, however, as a residence by the husband with his house-
keeper, he awaiting the arrival of his wife and children from another state, has
been held sufficient to impress the homestead character upon the premises. Hence,
a conveyance by the husband alone, prior to the arrival of the wife and family,
was adjudged to be void. Williams vs. Sweatland, 10 Iowa 51. But see Hfolden vs.
Pinney, 6 Cal. 235, and other cases, infra.
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483; True vs. iHorrill, 28 Verm. 672; .31ithery vs. Walker, 17 Texas
693, 582; Prior vs. Stone, 19 Texas 371; -Davis vs. Andrews,
30 Verm. 678; Earle vs. Earle, 9 Texas 680; Kitchell vs. .Burgwin,
21 Ill. 45; Walters vs. The People, 21 Id. 178.
Upon the principle that the homestead right does not become
perfect until actual residence by the family, a mortgage, executed
alone by a married man who was himself living upon the premises,
but whose wife had never resided in the state, is valid, even though
the premises become the home of both after the execution of the
mortgage. BHolden vs. Pinney, 6 Cal. 235, 630; .3feyer vs. Claus,
15 Texas 516; Keiffer vs. iBarney, 31 Ala. 192; Allen vs. Manasse,
4 Id. 554. But see Williams vs. Sweatland, supra.
So where a man's wife was absent for near two years in another
state, on a visit, and during such absence the husband purchased
and improved certain property with the intention of making it his
home, and before the return of the wife executed a mortgage upon
it, the property was holden not to be a homestead as against the
mortgagee. BRix vs. -4ffenry, 7 Cal. 89; S. P. Benedict vs.
Burnell, 7 Id. 245; Wisner vs. Farnham, 2 Mich. (Gibbs) 472.
It is the duty of the husband to furnish a hoine for the family.
If after marriage he takes his wife to reside upon property that
was his before the marriage, such property thereby becomes a
homestead with all the incidents of a homestead. Bevalk vs.
Kraemer, 8 Cal. 66. But a trustee cannot acquire on land held
in trust a homestead right unincumbered by the trust. Shepherd
vs. White, 11 Texas 346.
cA man's homestead must (per BELL, J., 23 Texas 502) be his
place of residence; the place where he lives; where he usually
sleeps and eats; where he surrounds himself with the ordinary
insignia of a home, and where he may enjoy its immunities and
privacy." S.P. 39 N. H. 483. It follows from the foregoing that
a homestead necessarily includes the idea of a house which is the
home of the family. Franklin vs. Coffee, 18 Texas 413; Charless
vs. Lamberson, 1 Iowa 485.
Most of the statutes provide that the homestead shall consist of
a certain quantity of land, with the dwelling-house thereon, &c.
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When such is the case a homestead right cannot he asserted where
the party asserting it has no interest in the land, but only in ,the
building. Title to the land, or a right to demand title, or an
interest in the land, is essential. So held as against th.e wife, where
the house was erected on land which the husband, after his second
marriage, purchased in the name of his children by a previous
marriage, but with funds owned by him prior to his marriage with
the wife who set up the homestead claim. Smith vs. Smith, 12 Cal.
216; .Farmer vs. Simpson, 6 Texas 803; Beecher vs. Baldy, 7
Mich. 501; Shepherd vs. White, ubi supra. Some of the statutes
like that of Ohio expressly provide that a homesteaid may exist in
estates less than freehold; e. g. leasehold estates. Aside from
statutory provision to the contrary, no good yeason is perceived
why the homestead right should be limited to eptates in fee simple.
And where the statute exempts a homestead - owned by the debtor,"
it is held that a life estate or a lesser interest than absolute o'ner-
ship is within the protection of ,the statute. The statute protects
any interest of the debtor which might be sold on execution. Thip
doubtless, is the true test. Deere vs. Chapman, 25 Ill. 610; 33
Miss. 462. If the other requisites concur, the homestead right
will attach, without express statut9ry provision to that effect, in
favor of a lessee for years. Peland vs. De Bevard, Iowa, Supreme
Court, MS., June 1862.
Connected with the subject of the necessity, in general, of #itlal
occupation, is the question how far the homestead premises mustbq
contiguous. Where, as in Iowa and some other states this matter
is regulated by statute, this of course governs. Aside from statu-
tory requisition to that effect, contiguity is not absolutely essential.
Thus, where the law declared that the homestead might co1)sist,;pf
"c any town or city lot or lots in value not to exceed 2 P00,,.,&c.,
it was held that lots in a town need not be adjacent, if used in
good faith as part of the home for the convenience of the family.
Hancock vs. Morgan, 17 Texas 582;, S .Prior vs.. Stone,J19
Texas 371. But a vacant lot, never usaed ,pa.& 9f th homestead,
and wholly separated by a street from the residence of -the owner,
is not exempt. lethery vs. Wailceri 17 Tdxas 698. Nor can :iV
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separate piece of woodland from which wood was accustomed to be
obtained, or a piece of land occupied only as a shop, be regarded
as part of the homestead. True vs. Morrill, 28 Verm. 672; Walters
vs. The People, 18 Ill. 194.1
It is held in California that as soon as " a place, by the occu-
pancy, in good faith, of the family, acquires the character of a
homestead, the nature of the estate becomes changed. It is turned
into a sort of joint tenancy with right of survivorship, at least
between husband and wife, and this estate cannot be altered or
destroyed, except by the concurrence of both in the manner pro-
vided by law." Taylor vs. ifargous, 4 Cal. 268; 6 Id. 71. On
the other hand, and with much better reason, it is declared by
C. J. REDFIELD, 28 Verm. 544, that the homestead interest " is not
a fixed, definite estate in the land, capable of appraisal and separa-
tion to the creditor in the execution; but it is constantly liable to
variation, and to be defeated altogether by matters not of record,
or by deed, but resting altogether in oral evidence." The estate,
the title, whether it be in the husband or the wife, is not changed
or affected, but for the purpose of securing the homestead to the
family, the power of separate alienation is taken away. The law
makes no infringement upon the husband's or wife's right of pro-
perty, except such as may be necessary to carry out and secure the
object designed. Stewart vs. Mackey, 16 Texas 56; Gunnison vs.
Twitchell, 38 N. H. 62; Davis and Wife vs. Andrews, 80 Yerm.
678.
But on the death of the husband, if the right of homestead sur-
vives to the widow and family, the law will protect them in the
enjoyment of such right, f-om unjust interference on the part of
either the heirs at law, or general creditors. Thus .the adult heirs,
though not constituting part of the family, will not be permitted
to eject the widow or make her pay rent, at least so long as she
1 The statute provided that the exemption should consist of "the lot of ground
and the buildings thereon, occupied as a residence," &c. It was held that the act
contemplated but one piece of land, and that a tract of timber land, a mile distant,
yet necessary for fuel, &c., for the farm was not part of the homestead. Walters
vs. The People, mupra; S. C. 21 Ill. 178.
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resides on the property as her home. Keyes vs. -gill, 80 Verm. 759.
See further as to nature and extent of widow's and ininor's rights:
Green vs. Crow, 17 Texas 180; Gimble vs. Goode, 18 La; An. R.
852, 378, 398; Succession of Poulkes, 12 Id. 537, 885; Fletc er
vs. State Bank, 87 N. H. 869; Norris vs. Moulton, 84 N. H. 892;
Walters vs. The People, &c., 18 Ill. 194; S. 0. 21 Ill. 178; 28
Ill. 536, where it is held that a divorced woman is entitled to the
right, the husband being the guilty party. Where the right sur-
vives for the benefit of the wife and children, neither the home-
stead property, or the income thereof is assets or liable for the
payment of the debts of the deceased. In re, -Estate of Tompkins,
12 Cal. 114; Wood and Wife vs. Wheeler, 7 Texas 13; Dickson vs.
Chorn, 6 Iowa 19, 82; 23 Texas 585; 17 Id. 135, 180.
Not only so, but the homestead right is favored by the courts,
and will be protected even in the husband's lifetime, against all
fraudulent schemes to defeat it. Therefore, if a deed to, the
homestead be delivered to the purchaser before the purchase-maney
is paid, and the purchase-money is attached in a suit brought by
the real though not the ostensible purchaser, equity will cancel the
deed so obtained.1 Still vs. Sanders, 8 Cal. 281.
If other parties have an interest in the land, as tguant. in
common, or as joint tenants, can a right of homestead exist f
accompanied with actual residence -on the land as a home.? 'The
writer sees no good reason, in view ofthe object and design of the
homestead policy, why this question should not be answered
affirmatively. The few decisions, however, which have been made
touching this point are not entirely accordant. In New Hampshire
it has been -determined that ,the conveyance of an undivided-in-
terest, if possession' be not abandoned,, does not waive the home-
stead right as to the part not conveyed. Bforn vs. Titfts,,39 N, ,H.
478 ; Slat. of Mass., supra. In California a different, conclusion
1 As to fraud in acquirlfton of t1 e honmtead, seosa.ortA vs. $,Aea, 1T exa&74;
Stone vs. Darnell, 20 Id. 11; Robinson vs. Willey, 15 N. Y. 489; S. C. 19 Barb. 157;
RandalZ v&. .vflgton, 10 Cal. 491. See 5 Cal. 488. Fraudulent disposition of
homotead. Wood vs. Chambert, 20 Texas 247; Dickson vs. Chorn, 6 Iowa 19, 31;
Beals vs. Clark, 18 Gray 18. J ,
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has been arrived at, under a statute not essentially dissimilar from
that of New Hampshire. The act requires the homestead to con-
sist of a certain quantity of land, with the dwelling-house, &c., not
exceeding in value 55000. Under this it was held that homesteads
could not be carved out of, or exist in lands held in, joint tenancy,
or tenancy in common. Wolf vs. _leischacker, 5 Cal. 244; Reynolds
vs. Pixley, 6 Id. 165. It was even held that there. could be no
homestead right in lands owned by the husband, his wife and child,
as tenants in common. Griblin vs. Jordan, 6 Cal. 416. In Kellers-
berger vs. Kopp, 6 Cal. 563, the principle was pressed still further,
and it was determined that an existing homestead tight was ipso
facto destroyed by the conveyance of an undivided portion, even
though the grantors and grantee both continued to occupy as their
respective homes different parts of the same building. The reason
assigned for this holding (5 Cal. 244), to wit: that the statute has
provided no mode of separation, and because a division and ap-
praisal would put the other owners to trouble, is not satisfactory.
If the homestead owner chooses to convey part of his home, why
should he thereby forfeit his right to the remainder ? Creditors
could not justly complain, because they would be benefited rather
than injured thereby. The question whether a homestead right
can exist in lands held by tenants in common is now before the
Supreme Court of Iowa in Thorn vs. Thorn, and is not yet de-
cided. The decision will appear in 13 Iowa Reports.
In considering the nature of the homestead right, one or two
other subjects of importance remain, which will be briefly alluded
to. In Gary vs. Eastabrook, 6 Cal. 457, the question is suggested
but not decided whether there can be a homestead right in build-
ings used for hotels, stores, &e. It is said by WRIGHT, C. J.
(arguendo), in Rhodes et al. vs. AIcCormick, 4 Iowa 368, that the
object of the law is to protect the home and preserve it for the
family, and not shops, office-rooms, and hotels, which are rented to
and occupied by other persons. It is not sufficient to constitute a
homestead that its owner used the front room of the building for
the sale of groceries, slept in the back room, and took his meals
habitually at a hotel. Philleo vs. Smalley, 23 Texas 498.
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Under a statute limiting the extent of ground, but not the value
of the homestead, and which provides that the "chomestead must
embrace the house used as a home by the owner," it was deter-
mined (one judge dissenting) that a portion of a building used as
a home by the owner was exempt, but otherwise as to the remainder
- of the building not thus used,-the presumption, however, being
that the whole is exempt until the contrary is shown. _hodes et al.
vs. McCormick, 4 Iowa 368.1 (STOCKTON, J., dissentiente.)
1 The facts upon which this decision was made are thus given in Dmx.oi's Iow4
DTGEST, p. 503, 3 :-" The house, in this case, was a three story brick building,
erected on a half lot in the city of Muscatine, and costing some $8000. The
' cellar and first floor were designed by the owner (who was the bead of a family
and the defendant in execution) as a business house (a store) ; and the second
and third floors as a family residence.' The second and third floors were occupied
as a residence by the owner and his family, and by another person and his family,
but had been previously rented in part for offices; the cellar and first floor wpre
rented to and occupied by a tenant as a store: Held, that the cellar and first floor
of the building were liable to be seized and sold on execution, and that the soil
and the second and third stories were exempt." 4 Iowa 368. The majority opinion
in this case was delivered by a very able judge (WRIGHT, C. 3.), and the grounds
upon which it Yests are very forcibly argued by him. Jt may not be improper to
add, however, that the correctness of the conclusion arrived at has been seriously
questioned by many members of the bar, not on the ground that the decision,
abstractly considered, was not just,.but for the reason that as the statute had not
piovided for such a division of the homestead, the court could not make it, and
therefore that the whole building was exempt or none.
J. F. D.
DAVENPORT, IOWA.
(To be concluded in the next number.)
